What Pollock and Rothko may have announced and Restorative Justice may have to deal with: sovereign victim culture by Lippens, RLG
1 
 
What Pollock and Rothko may have announced and Restorative Justice may 
have to deal with: sovereign victim culture. 
 
Ronnie Lippens 
Professor of Criminology 
Keele University 





A close reading of EU Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 (EU Member 
States to comply by 16 November 2015), “establishing minimum standards on 
the rights, support and protection of victims of crime”, may reveal that a 
particular image of victimhood seems to be underpinning the text. This image 
projects victims as atomically separate entities who, clad in individual rights, 
may choose to ‘make contact’ (or not, as the case may be). An attempt will 
be made to argue that this image could be situated within a ‘sovereign 
victim culture’ that flourishes at the heart of what is often called ‘control 
society’. The origins of this culture, it shall further be argued, could be traced 
back to the aftermath of the Second World War, when elements of it first 
emerged in work by artists such as Jackson Pollock and Mark Rothko. This 
culture is shot through with agony and as such threatens to undermine the 
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If restorative justice is not just about restoring what was (if ever that were 
possible of course) but, rather, about transforming what is, then it pays to 
contemplate the conditions of possibility for anything like successful 
restorative justice practices to take shape and develop. One could also 
phrase this negatively by asking if, in this day and age, there are conditions 
(whether cultural or otherwise) that make any attempt at transformative 
justice seem if not naive, then overly optimistic. In this contribution an attempt 
shall be made to explore this question from ‘the outside’. By this phrase is 
meant not only that the author is not writing from within what is sometimes 
called the movement of restorative justice policymakers, practitioners and 
researchers, but also, and perhaps more importantly, that the focus will be on 
the broader cultural conditions within which this movement, of necessity, has 
to take shape and forge paths.  
The starting point in this paper is EU Directive 2012/29/EU, “establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime” 
(available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/). Replacing an earlier Council 
Framework Decision dating back to 2001 (i.e. 2001/220/JHA) the Directive 
compelled EU Member States to comply with its provisions by the end of 2015. 
In the Directive restorative justice is mentioned explicitly in two of its articles 
(i.e. articles 12 and 19). What is of interest here though is the image of 
victimhood that can be sensed in the text of the Directive. The word ‘sensed’ 
is used in this context because any encounter with images, or with image, is 
largely a matter of the senses. Such encounters are sensory rather than purely 
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cognitive or intellectual experiences. The text of the Directive as well as its 
explanatory guide document, include statements that hold that “the victim” 
is an “individual with individual needs”. He or she moves through “services” 
that “can be of benefit” to them. They are “free” to engage with those 
services or may “withdraw at any time” depending on their “interest”. The 
victim is in need of constant “safeguarding”. In fact, if necessary “conditions 
to enable avoidance of contact” between offender and victim should be 
put in place. That could include arranging “separate waiting areas”. In a 
document on victim rights that explicitly mentions restorative justice, such 
emphasis on separation and avoidance of contact does seem striking. The 
overall image of victimhood that seems to be appearing from the text of the 
Directive is one whereby the victim enters the scene as a monadic individual, 
hermetically separated from his or her surroundings, clad with the power of 
total sovereign control over his or her life choices, who wades through a 
stream of services or anything else that can be of benefit, and who chooses, 
like a real sovereign consumer, whatever he or she thinks is in their interest. 
To repeat, this is just an image that can arguably be ‘sensed’ between the 
lines of the Directive. The extent to which actual victims of crime actually 
behave as the image suggests, or EU member states are now in the process, 
following the Directive, of implementing or reforming victim support and 
restorative justice systems and practices according to the outlines of the 
aforementioned imagery, is not the aim of this contribution. But a few words 
can be said. As to the theme of actual victim desire and behaviour, research 
seems to suggest that indeed many victims, although often exhibiting a pro-
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social attitude (Van Camp, 2016), tend to also harbour slightly consumerist 
desires for complete information –which should be ‘proactively’ provided by 
criminal justice officials- whilst at the same time reserving the right to ‘freely’ 
engage with the available Restorative Justice offer (Van Camp and 
Wemmers, 2015; see also Gavrielides, 2017, and infra).  As to the efforts with 
which EU member states are actually implementing or reforming their 
Restorative Justice provision, and Victim Support provisions more broadly, 
and the nature of those changes (if changes there will be), it is, at the time of 
writing, too soon to tell. Member states are not required to submit their first 
reports on this issue before the end of 2017. But if previous experience is 
anything to go by it is likely that, although a certain common trend in systems 
and practices is likely to become discernible (Lauwaert and Aertsen, 2016), a 
wide diversity will also be noticeable. In fact, whereas authors such as Katrien 
Lauwaert (2013; 2015) have made a plea for Restorative Justice to be 
provided more extensively, and for “equal access” to be made possible at all 
stages of the criminal justice process, others, such as Theo Gavrielides (2016) 
value local difference much more positively, adding that if Restorative Justice 
is to have a future in Europe, it will have to focus a lot more on harnessing 
localised bottom-up processes, and less on top-down standardization.  
The image of the sovereign victim-consumer, we shall argue below, is one of 
the manifestations of a new form of life which, it could be argued, emerged 
in the wake of the Second World War. Although this form of life generated 
the conditions of possibility for restorative justice to emerge at all, it now also 
harbours, after decades of radicalisation, the latter’s conditions of 
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impossibility. Those conditions of impossibility are now beginning to become 
dominant. This will be our first, overall thesis. Our secondary thesis holds that 
the work of artists such as Jackson Pollock (1912-1956) and Mark Rothko 
(1903-1970) may have announced these conditions of impossibility as early as 
1950. What painters such as Pollock and Rothko, each in their quite differing 
ways, announced, was quite deep. They announced nothing short of the 
arrival of a new form of life at the heart of which one might be able to 
discern a radical and radically new default operational logic that shattered 
and replaced the one that had culturally dominated the best part of 
Modernity. The latter went roughly as follows: if all else fails, submit, and 
sacrifice. The new default logic, visible and ‘sensed’ for the first time in 
Pollock’s and in Rothko’s work, projects: if all else fails, refute all foundation 
(Lippens, 2015a and 2015b, 2016 and 2017).    
 
Pollock’s and Rothko’s Announcement 
It is hard to overstate the cultural impact of the Second World War. The 
experience of authoritarianism and its catastrophic consequences 
generated an anti-authoritarian mood and attitude, particularly in what we 
still call Western democracies. This mood and attitude are still very much with 
us. Underpinning this mood and attitude, however, was a deep, almost 
seismic shift whereby a particular form of life gradually replaced an earlier 
one at the heart of social and cultural life. The new form of life, full of distrust 
towards authoritarianism, and indeed authority as such, crystallised around 
the desire, or will, not to be dependent on law or code, any law or code. This 
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desire, or will, is a desire for, or will to absolute sovereignty, personal 
sovereignty. This desire, or this will, gradually came to form the kernel of a 
newly emerging form of life.  
Let us be clear: this desire, or this will, dwells in the imaginary. Absolute 
sovereignty is imaginary sovereignty. It is also illusionary sovereignty. It 
certainly is paradoxical sovereignty: he or she who desires, or wills to be 
completely and utterly, absolutely independent from law or code, is, at the 
very least, dependent on the law and the code (and anything else, for that 
matter) that make up and support their desire for, or their will to sovereign 
independence. But this paradox is largely irrelevant for our purposes. The fact 
that the aspiring sovereign imagines him or herself to be sovereign is all that 
matters here.  
He, or she, is sovereign who is able to escape or elude all law, and all code. 
There are two basic ways in which one could hope to escape or elude (in the 
imaginary, of course) all law and code. The first is one whereby the aspiring 
sovereign imagines him or herself diving in a kind of primordial zone, i.e. a 
zone before human law or human code (in short: before human civilization). 
This implies a strategy through which one attempts to ‘become animal’ (to 
evoke vitalist philosophical language, e.g. Gilles Deleuze’s, 1994). The second 
strategy is one whereby the aspiring sovereign makes an effort to transcend 
and move beyond humanity as such, desiring to become, in a Nietzschean 
vein, superhuman. Pollock, one could argue, announced the first strategy; 
Rothko the second. Both are strategies that aim at establishing, or at least 
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accepting, what has been called by many the post-human moment in 
culture.  
Most readers will be familiar with Jackson Pollock’s signature style ‘drip 
technique’ paintings. Pollock achieved this particular painting style around 
the year 1950. It is sometimes thought that, in his drip paintings, Pollock 
wanted to express or represent chaos. But that is not the case. In fact, Pollock 
was adamant that, instead of expressing chaos, his paintings were all about 
control, absolute control, complete and utter control. Becoming animal, 
Pollock rarely spoke about his work, or about anything else for that matter 
(and that should not come as too big a surprise in light of what is about to 
follow). However, he did manage to convey the message that ‘control’ takes 
centre stage in his signature paintings (on this, see also e.g Lippens, 2010 and 
2011a). Like the painter himself, Pollock’s aspiring sovereign tries to achieve 
absolute sovereignty by frenetically escaping from anything that appears to 
emerge as a structure with its own law or code. Some commentators go so 
far as to claim that Pollock’s aspiring sovereign aims to escape even the 
sheer laws of nature and gravity (on this point, see Cernuschi and Herczynski, 
2008). Like Pollock during his painting, the aspiring sovereign here moves from 
one twirling eddy to the next. None shall be allowed to stabilize and project 
its law and code. Sovereignty, in Pollock’s work, is a constant flight from all 
law and code, from all structure. It is precisely through this constant fleeing 
that Pollock’s aspiring sovereign hopes to attain total, absolute control, and 
to achieve absolute sovereignty (however imaginary, illusory and 
paradoxical this hope may be). This is not a million miles from what the French 
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philosopher Georges Bataille (1897 – 1962) was writing about a few years 
after Pollock’s drip paintings had entered the post-war cultural scene. In his 
work on Eroticism (1957), Bataille, who had previously been thinking about the 
notion of sovereignty (1954), introduced the idea of continuous life. One can 
achieve sovereignty in continuous life. Continuous life is life in a zone where 
the boundaries between supposedly essential differences have dissolved. In 
dissolving the boundaries between the aspiring sovereign’s own self, on the 
one hand, and primordial nature, on the other, that is, by not allowing his or 
her self to be captured by any law or code whatsoever, the aspiring 
sovereign lives his or life in pure continuity with the world. This aspiring 
sovereign, then, is on a continuous flight from the strictures of functionality. He 
or she is constantly and frenetically trying to elude all structure, and all 
stricture, that human civilization incessantly generates. Here again: this flight is 
a highly paradoxical one. Indeed, he or she who is desperately trying to 
elude capture by civilization’s functionalities is ... captured by them.  
Unlike Pollock, Rothko did talk and write a lot about art, his own paintings 
included (e.g. Rothko, 2006). A Nietzsche-scholar and art critic of some 
renown, Rothko achieved his signature style also around the year 1950 (see 
e.g. Lippens 2010, 2012). In his paintings the oblong shapes that seem to be 
floating against a backdrop that keeps them apart, despite some tentative 
fraying at their edges, are, Rothko wrote, “entities” that move around in the 
world, “unabashed”, and unbound by morality or the “familiarities” of 
everyday life. Ever the Nietzschean, Rothko elsewhere added that his 
paintings hint at the inescapable “tragedy” and “doom” that characterize 
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human life, and the desperate attempts made therein, to attain superhuman 
detachment and sovereignty. The “entities” in Rothko’s paintings do not show 
any internal structure or partition. Clearly, they have not been captured by 
law or by code. There is a hint of agony and desperation to be noticed 
though in the slight differences of the hues (caused by minute variations in 
the thickness of the applied paint) within each of the floating entities. Drifting 
in imaginary splendid superhuman isolation, Rothko’s aspiring sovereign 
reflects upon the world. He or she however keeps their distance, and is no 
longer willing to spend any of their primordial potential in anything that even 
vaguely resembles engagement with or commitment to the law or the code 
of a joint project. This may remind us of the case (theorized by French 
philosopher Paul Virilio in 1981) of Howard Hughes, the industrialist and 
Hollywood mogul who at some point in his life actually decided to live such a 
life of completely detached, reflective isolation, painfully saving, in the 
process, all of his potential, including his urine. Rothko’s aspiring sovereign is 
on a constant flight from the structures and strictures of the world, and from 
civilization’s functionalities therein in particular. He or she travels on imaginary 
roads towards pure reflection. In their imaginary world their selves, like 
Rothko’s entities, have been emptied and transformed into reflecting 
chambers that float around in the world, far away from the law and code of 
others.      
 
The Emergence of Control Society 
10 
 
It can be argued that Pollock and Rothko, each in their own way, were 
harbingers of a new form of life. This is a form of life that crystallizes around the 
desire for, or will to absolute sovereignty. And that desire or will is all about 
achieving control, total, utter and complete sovereign control (however 
imaginary, illusory and paradoxical any such endeavour may be, of course). 
One could call this form of life ‘control society’. Philosophers such as Gilles 
Deleuze (1990) have used this notion before, albeit in a slightly different 
context. For Deleuze, ‘control society’ is the form of life and governance that, 
in late modernity, has (as Foucault had it) come to replace ‘disciplinary 
society’ as the dominant mode of governmentality. In the contribution at 
hand the phrase is used to indicate the seismic cultural shift that occurred in 
the wake of the Second World War and that saw the birth of a new form of 
life, i.e. the form of life of aspiring sovereigns who imagine their total escape 
from law and code, and who harbour a desire for, or will to absolute control 
(see also Lippens, 2011b).  
As said, this desire for, or will to absolute control often manifests itself in an 
unrelenting flight from all law and all code. Those who allow themselves to be 
captured by law or code, any law or any code, could never be in control, 
and could therefore never be sovereign. On the road to absolute control, to 
absolutely sovereign control, the aspiring sovereign acquires a deep sense of 
ambivalence. In his or her imaginary world, on his or her imaginary road, 
nothing is fixed anymore. Those who were friends only yesterday may today 
have become enemies and competitors. And vice versa: yesterday’s foes 
may, today, prove to be potential allies. This comes as no surprise to 
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sociologists who have been able to establish the very significant 
instrumentalism in relationships and friendships in late modern times (e.g. in 
Hall, et al., 2005). To the aspiring sovereign, the external world appears as a 
string of situations and contexts that need to be controlled –merely 
controlled, not transformed- according to the exigencies in the hic et nunc. 
Whereas in a previously dominant form of life the default operational logic 
went something like If all else fails, submit and sacrifice, the aspiring sovereign 
is –all else failing- no longer willing to submit to anything or anyone, or to 
sacrifice anything to anything. He or she is no longer prepared to sacrifice to 
law, to code, to tradition, to social convention, to the past, to the future, to 
nature, to biology, to Utopia, or to anything else that suggests a ‘must’, an 
‘ought’ or a ‘should’. In the form of life and governance that we have called 
‘control society’ the default operational logic is this one: if all else fails, refute 
all foundation. The aspiring sovereign harbours a very serious distrust of 
foundations, principles, dogma and all things supposedly fixed. His or her time 
is now. His or her space is here. His or her world is the situation here and now.  
On the road to absolute control though the aspiring sovereign notices 
hindrance and experiences irritation everywhere. The tiniest of bumps on the 
road become insufferable, totally unbearable. There can be neither 
submission, nor sacrifice, however small, on the road to total sovereign 
control. In this form of life, life is perpetual agony. It is there, on this very road, 
that the aspiring sovereign becomes an ‘eternal victim’. He or she 
experiences ‘victimization’ everywhere they go. In their desperate attempt to 
elude all the law and all the code of the world, that very world keeps 
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encroaching upon them. The aspiring sovereign who chose to deploy the 
becoming animal strategy experiences ‘victimization’ from discontinuous 
elements (dixit Bataille) that keep disturbing his or her imaginary dreams of 
total continuous control. In the ‘superhuman’ strategy, the aspiring sovereign 
is constantly irritated by ‘victimizations’ from forces and elements that keep 
impacting upon his or her detached reflecting bubble.   
The form of life lived by aspiring absolute sovereigns has, in the course of the 
decades, spawned its own parody: consumer culture. Wading though floods 
of consumer commodities and images, sampling and selecting and trying 
some, only to discard them again according to the demands of the situation 
in the here and the now, and fashioning and re-fashioning his or her self in the 
process, the aspiring sovereign achieves an illusion of control. It is mere illusion 
though. The consumer-sovereign actually submits him or herself to the law 
and to the codes of a deeply pervasive consumer culture. The illusion of 
sovereignty in consumer culture masks the submission and the sacrifice of the 
self to the law and codes embedded in image and commodity. Here the 
aspiring sovereign’s agony takes a particular form. It expresses itself, as 
Zygmunt Bauman argues in The Art of Life (2008), in an endless litany of 
consumerist desires and disappointments. 
At this point we should make a connection with the image of victimhood 
which we were able to ‘sense’ in the text of EU Directive 2012/29/EU. In the 
Directive the victim appears as a monadic consumer of resources that he or 
she may, or may not, decide to sample. In one of his recent papers Theo 
Gavrielides (2017) asks the question ‘what victims want’. His empirical data 
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suggests a broad and quite consistent consumerist attitude that seems to be 
prevalent among both ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ (and why indeed would 
there be a difference here?). Research by others has, in addition, noted a 
quite significant desire for, or will to ‘empowerment’ in victims engaged in 
restorative justice practices. While this should not surprise us (sovereign 
aspiration and ‘empowerment’ go well together) it could also be stressed, 
once more, that the aspiring victim-sovereign’s thirst for empowerment is 
ultimately and paradoxically underpinned by and dependent on regulatory 
processes that aim to ‘produce and govern active subjects’ while at the 
same time attempting to produce and govern through active subjects 
(Richards, 2011).  
 
Sovereign Victim Culture and Transformative Restorative Justice  
Submitting to the law and codes of consumer culture provides the aspiring 
sovereign with an illusion of control. His or her outlook on life thus becomes 
reactive. He or she no longer aims at transformative change, and the culture 
that emerges out of this is therefore largely non-communicative. This is not a 
new insight. Five decades ago already, authors such as Guy Debord (1967) 
noted the fact that in the then emerging consumer culture, or the society of 
the spectacle, as it was called, the consumption of commodity-image is, at 
heart, a non-communicative process whereby isolated consumers –however 
much they may be in physical proximity to each other- consume the 
spectacle alone. More recently, the French sociologist Michel Maffesoli (1988) 
analysed the trend, in late modern culture, towards neo-tribalism. In a neo-
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tribal age consumers only need affective proximity during consumption. They 
are reluctant to engage in genuine communication. Genuine 
communication is potentially transformative communication and that is what 
late modern consumers, on their way to becoming animal, have no need for. 
In his novel Elementary Particles French novelist Michel Houellebecq (2010) for 
example depicts the end point of this cultural drift into neo-tribalism: a world 
peopled by monadic entities who only get together to indulge in mute 
hedonistic consumptive exchanges that play out at the most basic 
biological, indeed merely physical level (the level of “elementary particles”, 
that is).  
If this applies to the consumer-sovereign, it does so also to the life of the 
aspiring sovereign as such. He or she has become reactive. He or she is no 
longer interested in transformative change, and is therefore non-
communicative. The aspiring sovereign may decide to engage in lots of 
chatter. But more often than not, this chatter will not be aimed towards 
transformative change, and will therefore not constitute real, genuine 
communication. The aspiring sovereign has lost all interest in transformative 
change. He or she is no longer willing or prepared to sacrifice anything to 
change, or to future. His or her time is now. Living in the present, in the 
moment even, he or she no longer needs future. In this form of life aspirations 
do not often go beyond the precautionary desire, or will, to simply block off 
anything that is undesired. The aspiring sovereign is content just to control the 
situation that he or she finds himself in, and to ‘safeguard’ their own ‘interest’ 
in the process (to evoke once again the language in Directive 2012/29/EU).  
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It could be argued that, well into the 21st century, this development is now 
threatening to undermine the conditions of possibility for anything like 
transformative restorative justice to be able to emerge at all. Let us qualify 
this statement. The form of life that has sovereign aspiration at its heart is of 
course not completely dominant in contemporary culture. And its default 
operational logic (i.e. if all else fails, refute all foundation) is only a default 
logic. It kicks in if all else fails. There is in everyday life exchanges always a 
level of interaction whereby actors agree to jointly work towards common 
goals. What can be argued though is that in an age of sovereign aspiration, 
or in ‘control society’, such interactions and decisions are now quite often 
underpinned by a default operational logic that lurks somewhere in the 
background, and that could take over if all else fails. But that means that 
everyday interactions and decisions have become contingent, at least to 
some extent, on this possibility really actualizing. They have, in other words, 
acquired a much more strategic or even instrumental character. Let us also 
remind ourselves that at the time of its emergence, in the wake of the 
Second World War, this form of life and its corresponding default logic were 
part of the conditions of possibility for anti-authoritarian models and 
movements to take shape. Those included, roughly from the early 1970s 
onwards, informal conflict resolution models and the broader restorative 
justice movement. Today however the sovereign aspirations and operational 
logic within ‘control society’ have radicalised to such an extent that what 
used to be conditions of possibility are now gradually threatening to turn into 
conditions of impossibility. The challenge for the restorative justice movement 
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now becomes to think through forms of restorative justice practice that on 
the one hand connect onto sovereign aspiration and the desire for, or will to 
control that comes with it, and use those as a resource, but that, on the other 
hand, also require and stimulate genuine communication. Genuine 
communication is communication that is geared towards achieving 
common goals. Only when people engage collaboratively in joint efforts, 
with their sights trained on common goals and futures, will they experience 
the need to communicate genuinely. Only then will they be inclined to make 
an effort to understand each other’s plight, and gauge each other’s 
potential.  
The notion of ‘sovereignty as control over emergence’ may help us to think 
such forms (see also Lippens, 2012). This notion leads us away from the two 
more dominant ones, i.e. those that imagine sovereignty to reside in attempts 
to escape or elude all law, and all code, or in attempts to attain total and 
absolute independence from the world. Above we discussed two such 
strategies, i.e. Pollock’s becoming animal, and Rothko’s superhuman 
strategy. Both, as we have seen, are highly illusory and indeed paradoxical 
strategies: if the aspiring sovereign reached his or her illusory goal of absolute 
sovereignty and absolute control, they would in the same instant also lose all 
sovereign capacity. Sovereignty and control, or sovereign control, could 
never be absolute. Sovereign control can only be achieved in emergence, 
that is, in the process whereby the new is brought into the world. It can only 
emerge in and through a creative process. But here it becomes clear that 
any sovereign control that emerges in a creative process could never be 
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absolute, or total. It will always be partial. Creative action requires the 
aspiring sovereign to actively engage with the world, and in that very 
engagement all hopes for total, absolute control should be relinquished. 
Sovereign control, then, is only possible –and always partial- if and when it 
results from engagement in a creative process. All other forms of sovereign 
aspiration are paradoxical and ultimately self-defeating. They only lead to 
endless cycles of agony.    
It is not easy to imagine restorative justice practices that accommodate both 
aforementioned requirements. It may very well be that our imagination falters 
here. This would not come as too big a surprise if indeed the argument 
developed above makes any sense at all. Although it may be safe to say 
that the invention of and experimentation with transformative forms of 
restorative justice practice are best left to those who are already engaged in 
restorative justice initiatives, there is one insight that this contribution would 
like to emphasize, and that is that, if it is indeed the case that there is radical 
sovereign inspiration ‘out there’, then there is no point in ignoring or 
discarding it. The better option is to use it, and work with it. One way of doing 
this is to harness this sovereign aspiration in creative joint projects that aim at 
bringing newness, or change, to ways of living together, whether at the local 
level or beyond. The very process of creation itself should then require the 
parties involved to genuinely communicate with an eye on the common 
goal. This is, admittedly, a tall order. Moreover, it would not be advisable to 
present this option as a law or a code which has to be submitted to. Aspiring 
sovereigns are no longer willing, all else failing, to submit or sacrifice to 
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anything or anyone. That said though, one would hope that there may be 
scope for attempts to persuade aspiring sovereigns that real sovereignty –
always partial- can only reside in the creative transformation of the world, 
and the ways of life in it, and that this in turn requires genuine, 
communicative engagement with others in joint, common projects. In 
restorative justice this would mean that aspiring sovereigns engage in 
collaborative efforts to bring newness into the world through changing the 
ways in which people’s lives relate to one another, and through working 
jointly on finding new common ground, producing it, maintaining it or, if 
possible, extending it. It is on the collaborative and communicative road to 
such goals that real sovereignty –sovereignty over the emergence of the 
new- can be experienced, or ‘sensed’. ‘Control’ is to be found only in 
communicative engagement with the world, not in the relentless flight from it.        
 
Conclusion 
In this contribution we started from a close reading of EU Directive 2012/29/EU 
“establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime”. A particular image of victimhood seems to be underpinning 
the text. This image projects victims as atomically separate entities who, clad 
in individual rights, may choose to ‘make contact’ (or not, as the case may 
be). An attempt was made to argue that this image could be situated within 
a ‘sovereign victim culture’ that flourishes at the heart of what is often called 
‘control society’. The origins of this culture, it was argued, could be traced 
back to the aftermath of the Second World War, when elements of it first 
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emerged in work by artists such as Jackson Pollock and Mark Rothko. This 
culture is shot through with an obsession with sovereign control and with 
resulting agony and as such threatens to undermine the conditions of 
possibility for transformative restorative justice. One way out of this 
conundrum could be to think through forms of restorative practices that on 
the one hand use sovereign aspiration in late modern culture as a resource 
while, on the other, also stimulating transformative communication. We have 
tried, however incompletely perhaps, and lacking most certainly, to suggest 
that restorative justice could offer a space for such attempts to marry 
sovereign aspiration with genuine, transformative communication. This space, 
it has been argued here, resides in the experience of joint, collaborative 
endeavours whereby those involved in restorative justice practices are invited 
and encouraged to work together on changing –transforming indeed- their 
worlds, and on creating new ways of sharing common ground. It is in such 
efforts, we hope –possibly against hope- that aspiring sovereigns will be more 
likely to replace self-destructive forms of sovereign life, and the agony that 
comes with them, with ones that, granted, are less absolute, but, on the other 
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